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ANTITRUST STANDING OF TARGET CORPORATIONS TO
ENJOIN HOSTILE TAKEOVERS UNDER SECTION 16
OF THE CLAYTON ACT
INTRODUCTION
Section 7 of the Clayton Act prohibits all acquisitions or mergers
whose effect "may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to
create a monopoly."' Consistent with this statutory scheme, the stan-
dards for evaluating the legality of intercorporate relationships have de-
veloped with cyclical changes in the economy and evolving federal
antitrust policy.2 As amended in 1950,1 section 7 reflected Congress'
strong concern with protecting small businesses from a "rising tide of
economic concentration" 4 in American industry and limiting the abuses
of corporate power.' This policy of small business protectionism shifted
1. Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 7, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (current version codified at 15
U.S.C. § 18 (1982)). Section 7 provides in relevant part:
No person ... shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or any part of the
stock... and no person... shall acquire the whole or any part of the assets of
another person.., where ... the effect of such acquisition may be substantially
to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.
As originally enacted, section 7 applied only to corporations. It has been amended to
now include unincorporated, as well as, incorporated entities. See H. Hovenkamp, Eco-
nomics and Federal Antitrust Law § 11.1, at 293 (1985). The term "person" is defined to
include "corporations and associations existing under or authorized by the laws of... the
United States. . . ." 15 U.S.C. § 12(a) (1982).
2. Throughout most of this century, antitrust decisonmaking has been dominated by
the traditional approach known as the "Harvard School" which espoused a relatively
prointerventionist view focusing on entrepreneurial independence and equality. See Fox,
The Modernization of Antitrust: A New Equilibrium, 66 Cornell L. Rev. 1140, 1146-55
(1981); Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy After Chicago, 84 Mich. L. Rev. 213, 217-25
(1982); Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust, 127 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1051 (1979).
Current antitrust thinking reflects the "economic approach" of the "Chicago School"
which emphasizes economic efficiency and less government intervention. For classic
statements of Chicago School economics, see generally R. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox:
A Policy at War With Itself (1978); R. Posner, Antitrust Law: An Economic Perspective
(1976).
3. Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 7, 38 Stat. 730 (1914), as amended by Celler-Kefauver
Antimerger Act, ch. 1184, 64 Stat. 1125 (1950) (current version codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 18 (1982)). The Clayton Act, which was the second major piece of antitrust legislation,
was designed primarily to arrest the feared consequences of intercorporate relationships
in their incipiency and before consummation. See United States v. E. I. du Pont de
Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 597 (1957). The first federal antitrust law was the Sher-
man Act, ch. 647, §§ 1-6, 8, 26 Stat. 209-10 (1890) (current version codified at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1-7 (1982)).
4. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 315 0962).
5. The legislative history of the Celler-Kefauver amendment clearly expresses Con-
gress' overwhelming concern with the evils of concentrating economic power in the hands
of too few large corporations. As Senator Estes Kefauver, a co-sponsor of the 1950
amendment, stated: "The present trend of great corporations to increase their economic
power is the antithesis of meritorious competitive development .... Local economic
independence cannot be preserved in the face of consolidations such as we have had dur-
ing the past few years." 96 Cong. Rec. 16,452 (1950). And Representative Emanuel
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markedly in the 1970s,6 however, in the wake of a national economy fet-
tered by a rapidly accelerating rate of inflation, lower productive output,
a growing balance-of-payments deficit, and increasing international com-
petition in world markets.7 Consequently, antitrust policy in the 1980s
emphasizes the efficiencies to be gained from mergers, despite potentially
greater postmerger market concentration, 8 on the theory that size and
Celler, floor manager and another sponsor of the bill, argued that without an amendment,
"big business will be hellbent for more and more mergers." 95 Cong. Rec. 11,485 (1949).
Modem judicial treatment of mergers starts with Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370
U.S. 294 (1962), the Supreme Court's first decision under amended section 7. Applying
the antimerger law, Chief Justice Warren, in his majority opinion, stated:
It is competition, not competitors, which the [Clayton] Act protects. But we
cannot fail to recognize Congress' desire to promote competition through the
protection of viable, small, locally owned businesses. Congress appreciated that
occasional higher costs and prices might result from the maintenance of frag-
mented industries and markets. It resolved these competing considerations in
favor of decentralization. We must give effect to that decision.
Id. at 344. For a comprehensive discussion of the legislative history behind the 1950
amendment to the Clayton Act, see Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 311-23. See also L. Sullivan,
Handbook of the Law of Antitrust § 199, at 592-93 (1977) ("Congress wanted the courts
to be tougher than they had been... and not to wait for a showing of power aggressively
used .... It wanted the courts to act at the edge of harm in order to choke off those
mergers likely ... to cause irreversible injury to the competitive process.").
6. See Fox, supra note 2, at 1152 ("Beginning in 1974, the first year of the Burger
Court's antitrust majority, antitrust law shifted course .... Whereas the word 'power'
dominated Warren Court antitrust opinions, the words 'efficiency' and 'market impact'
have prominence in Burger Court antitrust opinions.") (footnotes omitted). Compare
United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526, 540-43 (1973) (Douglas, J., con-
curring in part) ("Control of American business is being transferred from local communi-
ties to distant cities where men on the 54th floor with only balance sheets and profit and
loss statements before them decide the fate of communities with which they have little or
no relationship.") and Fortner Enters., Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495,
502-03 (1969) ("[E]conomic power ... can be sufficient even though the power falls far
short of dominance and even though the power exists only with respect to some of the
buyers in the market.") and United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 274-78
(1966) ("From this country's beginning there has been an abiding and widespread fear of
the evils which flow from monopoly - that is the concentration of economic power in
the hands of a few.") with United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 440-
41 (1978) ("the behavior proscribed by the [Sherman] Act is often difficult to distinguish
from the gray zone of socially acceptable and economically justifiable business conduct")
and Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 56-7 (1977) ("Economists
also have argued that manufacturers have an economic interest in maintaining as much
• . .competition as is consistent with the efficient distribution of their products.") and
United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 494-504 (1974) (exemplifies the
Burger Court's emphasis on efficiencies of production and resource allocation).
7. See Fox, supra note 2, at 1142-43; Joelson, Challenges to United States Foreign
Trade and Investment: Antitrust Law Perspectives, 14 Int'l Law. 103, 112-13 (1980).
8. See U.S. Department of Justice Merger Guidelines, reprinted in 1 Trade Reg.
Rep. (CCH) 1 4490-95 (June 14, 1984). These guidelines state: "Although they some-
times harm competition, mergers generally play an important role in a free enterprise
economy. They can penalize ineffective management and facilitate the efficient flow of
investment capital and the redeployment of existing productive assets." Id. 4491. "The
primary benefit of mergers to the economy is their efficiency-enhancing potential, which
can increase the competitiveness of firms and result in lower prices to consumers." Id.
§ 3.5, 4493.
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power may be necessary to compete effectively with foreign firms.9 The
fundamental goal of the antitrust laws, however, remains the same - the
enhancement of vigorous competition in the business sector for the bene-
fit of consumers and the economy at large.' 0
The Clayton Act provides two remedial provisions for private enforce-
ment of section 7. Section 4 awards treble damages to anyone who suf-
fers injury in his business or property by reason of a violation of the
antitrust laws. 1 Section 16 entitles any person threatened with loss or
damage by an antitrust violation to injunctive relief. 2
As a private party, the target of a contested takeover may seek an
injunction under section 16 to enjoin the contemplated action by alleging
a threatened violation of section 7 of the Clayton Act. The issue is
whether the target corporation has standing under the antitrust laws to
maintain such an action. Recently, in Cargill, Inc v. Monfort of Colo-
rado, Inc., 3 the Supreme Court held that a private party seeking injunc-
tive relief under section 16 has standing only if the plaintiff demonstrates
a threat of "antitrust injury."1 4 The critical inquiry in the takeover con-
text, therefore, is whether a target corporation can ever assert a plausible
theory of "antitrust injury" in order to maintain a section 16 action.
Whether the target corporation may invoke the antitrust laws to oppose
9. See Bickel, The Antitrust Division's Adoption of a Chicago School Economic Policy
Calls for Some Reorganization: But Is the Division's New Policy Here to Stay?, 20 Hous.
L. Rev. 1083, 1112 (1983); Joelson, supra note 7, at 112-13.
10. See Associated Gen. Contractors, Inc. v. California State Council of Carpenters,
459 U.S. 519, 538 (1983) ("As the legislative history shows, the [antitrust laws were]
enacted to assure customers the benefits of price competition .... "). In Northern Pac.
Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958), the Court stated:
The [antitrust laws were] designed to be a comprehensive charter of economic
liberty aimed at preserving free and unfettered competition .... It rests on the
premise that the unrestrained interaction of competitive forces will yield the
best allocation of our economic resources, the lowest prices, the highest quality
and the greatest material progress ....
Id at 4.
11. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982). Section 4 of the Clayton Act provides: "Any person who
shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the anti-
trust laws may sue therefor... and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained
.... " Originally enacted as section 7 of the Sherman Act, ch. 647, § 7, 26 Stat. 210
(1890), and extended to the Clayton Act in 1914, section 4 is a deterrence and compensa-
tory provision that awards treble damages to private parties harmed by a violation of the
antitrust laws.
12. 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1982). Section 16 of the Clayton Act provides in relevant part:
Any person, firm, corporation, or association shall be entitled to sue for and
have injunctive relief, in any court of the United States having jurisdiction over
the parties, against threatened loss or damage by a violation of the antitrust
laws.., when and under the same conditions and principles as injunctive relief
against threatened conduct that wvill cause loss or damage is granted by courts
of equity ....
13. 107 S. Ct. 484 (1986). For the facts and a detailed discussion of Cargill, see infra
notes 49-70 and accompanying text.
14. Id. at 491.
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a threatened takeover has created a division among the courts.'"
This Note examines whether a target corporation could have standing
under the Clayton Act to enjoin threatened takeovers. Part I traces the
development of standing requirements and the emergence of the antitrust
injury concept as an element of both section 4 and section 16 in private
antitrust actions. Part II analyzes antitrust injury suffered by a target
corporation seeking to enjoin a hostile takeover and the role of target
management as a proper plaintiff under the antitrust laws. This Note
concludes that conferment of standing is a factual determination to be
made under the circumstances of the case. Thus, if the target corpora-
tion contesting a takeover can make a proper preliminary showing of a
section 7 violation and sufficiently prove a threat of antitrust injury under
section 16, the courts should grant it standing.
I. ANTITRUST STANDING
A. Section 4 Damages and Antitrust Injury
The somewhat vague and malleable body of law known as "antitrust
standing"' 6 developed historically as a means of placing judicial limita-
tions on the broad language of the antitrust laws. 7 Because a literal
15. Compare Grumman Corp. v. LTV Corp., 665 F.2d 10, 11 (2d Cir. 1981) (prelimi-
nary injunctive relief granted to target corporation to enjoin proposed acquisition deemed
to be violative of Clayton Act) and Marathon Oil Co. v. Mobil Corp., 669 F.2d 378, 383-
84 (6th Cir. 1981) (preliminary injunction appropriate for target corporation to block
proposed acquisition), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 982 (1982) and Gearhart Indus. v. Smith
Int'l, Inc., 592 F. Supp. 203, 214 (N.D. Tex.) (target corporation had standing to enjoin
proposed tender offer but did not show substantial likelihood of success on the merits),
modified on other grounds, 741 F.2d 707 (5th Cir. 1984) and Babcock & Wilcox Co. v.
United Technologies Corp., 435 F. Supp. 1249, 1256, 1288 (N.D. Ohio 1977) (target
corporation of proposed tender offer had standing to sue but failed to prove its case on
the merits) with Central Nat'l Bank v. Rainbolt, 720 F.2d 1183, 1187 (10th Cir. 1983)
(neither target corporation nor shareholder-director had standing to prevent takeover
where harm asserted was not the result of diminution in competition) and A.D.M. Corp.
v. Sigma Instruments, Inc., 628 F.2d 753, 754 (1st Cir. 1980) (plaintiff lacked standing
because essential connection between the injury and the aims of the antitrust laws not
established) and Carter Hawley Hale Stores, Inc. v. Limited, Inc., 587 F. Supp. 246, 250
(C.D. Cal. 1984) (tender offer target lacked standing where harms alleged were not the
result of substantially lessened competition).
16. The doctrine of "antitrust standing" is somewhat different analytically from con-
stitutional standing. Actual or threatened harm to the plaintiff is sufficient to satisfy the
constitutional standing requirement of injury in fact within the meaning of the "case or
controversy" clause of article III of the Constitution. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490,
498-501 (1975); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 731-40 (1972). Standing in the
antitrust context, however, requires that the courts make an additional determination as
to "whether the plaintiff is a proper party to bring a private antitrust action." See Associ-
ated Gen. Contractors, Inc. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 535
n.31 (1983).
17. See Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 760 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing) ("I concede that despite the broad wording of § 4 there is a point beyond which the
wrongdoer should not be held liable. Courts have therefore developed various tests of
antitrust 'standing,' not unlike the concept of proximate cause in tort law, to define that
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interpretation of section 4 of the Clayton Act conceivably could confer a
right to treble damages on every person whose injuries are causally re-
lated to an antitrust violation,"8 the courts developed prudential standing
requirements to narrow the class of plaintiffs. 9 Imposition of such
standing requirements were justified on the grounds of guarding against
the dangers of windfall recoveries and other forms of inundation that
could result from a deluge of litigation against every company charged
with unlawful conduct.20 Although the courts struggled to articulate a
precise standing formula under such labels as the "direct injury" test,2 1
the "target area" test,22 the "zone of interests" test,23 and the balancing
point.") (citations omitted); Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238-39 (1918)
(Congress meant to condemn only unreasonable restraints of trade). See also Berger &
Bernstein, An Analytical Framework for Antitrust Standing, 86 Yale LJ. 809, 810-45
(1977) (discussion of the historical development of the standing doctrine).
18. See Associated Gen. Contractors, Inc. v. California State Council of Carpenters,
459 U.S. 519, 529-35 (1983); Blue Shield of Virginia, Inc. v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465,
472-73 (1982); Mid-West Paper Prods. Co. v. Continental Group, Inc., 596 F.2d 573, 581
(3d Cir. 1979); Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution M.D.L. No. 31 v. Automobile Mfrs.
Ass'n, 481 F.2d 122, 125 (9th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Morgan v. Automobile Mfrs.
Ass'n, 414 U.S. 1045 (1973); Berger & Bernstein, supra note 17, at 812.
19. See Associated Gen. Contractors, 459 U.S. 519, 529-35 (1983); Mid-West Paper
Prods. Co. v. Continental Group, Inc., 596 F.2d 573, 581 (3d Cir. 1979); Reibert v. At-
lantic Richfield Co., 471 F.2d 727, 731 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 938 (1973);
Berger & Bernstein, supra note 17, at 835-36; see also Blue Shield of Virginia, Inc. v.
McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 477 (1982) ("It is reasonable to assume that Congress did not
intend to allow every person tangentially affected by an antitrust violation to maintain an
action to recover threefold damages for the injury to his business or property."); Hawaii
v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 263 n.14 (1972) ("The ... courts have been virtually
unanimous in concluding that Congress did not intend the antitrust laws to provide a
remedy in damages for all injuries that might conceivably be traced to an antitrust viola-
tion."). For general discussions of standing under section 4 of the Clayton Act to seek
treble damages, see 2 P. Areeda & D. Turner, Antitrust Law 1 333-335, at 160-77
(1978); H. Hovenkamp, supra note 1, §§ 14.2-14.5, at 356-76; L. Sullivan, supra note 5,
§ 247, at 770-74.
20. For reasons for imposing standing limitations, see Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois,
431 U.S. 720, 741 (1977) (ease administrative burden placed on courts); Hawaii v. Stan-
dard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 262-64 (1972) (prevent duplicative recoveries); Jeffrey v.
Southwestern Bell, 518 F.2d 1129, 1131 (5th Cir. 1975) (avoid potentially disastrous fi-
nancial ruination of defendant); Snow Crest Beverages, Inc. v. Recipe Foods, Inc., 147 F.
Supp. 907, 909 (D. Mass. 1956) (windfall recoveries). See also Calderone Enters. Corp. v.
United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc., 454 F.2d 1292, 1295 (2d Cir. 1971) ("[I]f the flood-
gates were opened to permit treble damage suits by every creditor, stockholder, employee,
subcontractor, or supplier of goods and services that might be affected, the lure of a treble
recovery ... would result in an over-kill, due to an enlargement of the private weapon to
a caliber far exceeding that contemplated by Congress."), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 930
(1972).
21. Some courts focused on the directness of the injury and permitted only those
plaintiffs whose injury is considered to be the "direct" or "proximate" result of the an-
ticompetititve activity to maintain a private action. See, e.g., Volasco Prods. Co. v. Lloyd
A. Fry Roofing Co., 308 F.2d 383, 394-95 (6th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 907
(1963); Productive Inventions, Inc. v. Trico Prods. Corp., 224 F.2d 678, 679 (2d Cir.
1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 936 (1956); Loeb v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F. 704, 709 (3d
Cir. 1910).
22. Some courts required that the plaintiff be in a "target area" of the economy
threatened by a breakdown of competitive conditions in a particular industry. See. e.g.,
1987] 1043
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test,24 success proved elusive. More recently, the Supreme Court in Asso-
ciated General Contractors of California, Inc. v. California State Council
of Carpenters,2 5 consolidated the various policy objectives underlying
section 4 into a flexible series of relevant factors that are to be weighed in
determining standing under the Clayton Act. The factors include: the
specific relationship between the injury and the antitrust violation;26 the
directness or indirectness of the harm; 27 the speculative nature of the
injury;2" whether the scope of the antitrust litigation can be kept within
judicially manageable limits;29 and whether the nature of the injury is of
the type the antitrust laws were designed to prevent.30 In eschewing the
mechanical tests of antitrust standing previously used, the Court re-
quired that standing questions be analyzed "in light of" the particular
factual circumstances presented by each case. 3'
The last standing factor identified in Associated General Contractors,
whether the nature of the injury is of the type the antitrust laws were
designed to prevent, was first articulated as "antitrust injury" by the
Supreme Court in Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc.a2 In
Pan-Islamic Trade Corp. v. Exxon Corp., 632 F.2d 539, 546-47 (5th Cir. 1980), cert
denied, 454 U.S. 927 (1981); Engine Specialties, Inc. v. Bombardier Ltd., 605 F.2d 1, 17-
19 (1st Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 983 (1980); Calderone Enters. Corp. v. United
Artists Theater Circuit, Inc., 454 F.2d 1292, 1295 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S.
930 (1972).
23. Other courts inquired whether the injury arguably was within the "zone of inter-
ests" protected by the antitrust laws. See Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v.
Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970); Malamud v. Sinclair Oil Corp., 521 F.2d 1142, 1151-52
(6th Cir. 1975); Babcock & Wilcox Co. v. United Technologies Corp., 435 F. Supp. 1249,
1255 (N.D. Ohio 1977).
24. Some courts articulated factors they deemed significant in analyzing standing
under a balancing test. See Mid-West Paper Prods. Co. v. Continental Group, Inc., 596
F.2d 573, 582-87 (3d Cir. 1979); Bravman v. Bassett Furniture Indus., Inc., 552 F.2d 90,
99-100 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 823 (1977); Cromar Co. v. Nuclear Materials &
Equip. Corp., 543 F.2d 501, 505-10 (3d Cir. 1976).
25. 459 U.S. 519 (1983).
26. Id. at 537.
27. Id. at 540-42.
28. Id. at 542-43.
29. Id. at 543-45.
30. Id. at 538-40.
31. Id. at 536 & n.33. In identifying these factors, the Court discarded the idea that
standing could be determined by bright-line tests or by adopting a "black-letter rule"
applicable in all cases. Id. at 536.
32. 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977). The concept of antitrust standing is analytically differ-
ent from the concept of antitrust injury enunciated in Brunswick. See Handler, Changing
Trends in Antitrust Doctrines: An Unprecedented Supreme Court Term - 1977, 77
Colum. L. Rev. 979, 995-96 (1977); Page, Antitrust Damages and Economic Efficiency."
An Approach to Antitrust Injury, 47 U. Chi. L. Rev. 467, 497-98 (1980). The antitrust
standing requirement narrows the class of plaintiffs who may recover for antitrust injury.
See supra notes 16-24 and accompanying text. Antitrust injury defines the compensable
harm. Broadly speaking, it is a rule of standing because the plaintiff who has not suffered
antitrust injury will necessarily lack standing. See Page, supra, at 497. The plaintiff com-
petitors in Brunswick had standing to bring suit but could not recover damages. Bruns-
wick, 429 U.S. at 490. Thus, in the sense that they failed to show antitrust injury and
therefore were unable to recover, they may be said to "lack" standing. Indeed, courts
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Brunswick, a major manufacturer of bowling equipment had begun ac-
quiring and operating a large number of defaulting bowling centers that
would have gone bankrupt but for the acquisitions.33 The plaintiffs, com-
peting bowling center operators, challenged three of these takeovers as
illegal asset acquisitions under section 7.34 Seeking treble damages under
section 4, the competitors cited as injury, the lost profits they would have
made had the rival bowling centers been permitted to fail." In holding
that the plaintiffs lacked standing, the Court stressed that the antitrust
laws "were enacted for 'the protection of competition, not competi-
tors.' ,'36 Brunswick set down the rule that to recover section 4 treble
damages, the plaintiff must prove more than a section 7 violation. 37 The
plaintiff must prove antitrust injury, which is to say injury of the type the
antitrust laws were intended to prevent and that flows from that which
makes the defendants' acts unlawful a.3  The Court observed that the anti-
trust injury requirement had not been met in this case, however, because
the competitors' alleged lost profits resulted not from any anticompeti-
tive action on the part of Brunswick, but rather from the continued com-
petition of the revitalized bowling centers.39  Thus, unless
anticompetitive behavior is present, the fact of injury is not a concern of
the antitrust laws, regardless of whether a merger is legal or illegal.'
B. Section 16 Injunctions after Cargill
Lower courts often have noted that the standing requirements under
section 16 are less stringent than those under section 4.41 While section 4
and commentators have considered Brunswick a standing case. See John Lenore & Co. v.
Olympia Brewing Co., 550 F.2d 495, 498-99 (9th Cir. 1977); Juneau Square Corp. v. First
Wis. Nat'l Bank, 445 F. Supp. 965, 969-70 (E.D. Wis. 1978); Page, supra, at 497.
33. 429 U.S. at 479-80. More than $100,000,000 or over 25% of Brunswick's ac-
counts were more than 90 days in arrears. These acquisitions made the bowling equip-
ment manufacturer the largest bowling center operator in the country. Id.
34. See id. at 480. To establish a section 7 violation, the smaller bowling center oper-
ators sought to prove that the larger deep pocket competitor had the capacity to engage
in anticompetitive behavior by driving them out of business. See id. at 481-82.
35. See id. at 481.
36. Id at 488 (emphasis in original) (quoting Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370
U.S. 294, 320 (1962)).
37. Brunswick, 429 U.S. at 486.
38. See id at 489. The Court stated:
[Plaintiffs] must prove more than injury causally linked to an illegal presence in
the market [on account of a section 7 violation]. Plaintiffs must prove antitrust
injury, which is to say injury of the type the antitrust laws were intended to
prevent and that flows from that which makes defendants' acts unlawful. The
injury should reflect the anticompetitive effect either of the violation or of an-
ticompetitive acts made possible by the violation.
Id. (emphasis in original).
39. See id at 488.
40. See id at 487.
41. See Grumman Corp. v. LTV Corp., 665 F.2d 10, 16 n.4 (2d Cir. 1981);
Schoenkopf v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 637 F.2d 205, 210 (3d Cir. 1980);
1987] 1045
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requires a showing of injury in fact,42 section 16 requires only a threat of
injury.43 Moreover, because plaintiffs under section 16 are seeking equi-
table relief rather than treble damages and because no complex issues of
damages or speculative or duplicative recoveries arise," most courts have
not questioned standing under section 16.4 Thus, in the takeover con-
text some courts have not raised the issue of target standing as it related
to the existence of antitrust injury.4 6 Rather, these courts granted in-
junctive relief where anticompetitive effects under section 7 were
threatened or present, and where the target's injuries were found to be
irreparable.47 Other courts, however, denied the plaintiff standing when
the quantum of proof did not meet the Brunswick antitrust injury re-
quirement previously applicable only to section 4 actions.4"
Recently, the Supreme Court in Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado,
Bogus v. American Speech & Hearing Ass'n, 582 F.2d 277, 288 (3d Cir. 1978); Hawaii v.
Standard Oil Co., 431 F.2d 1282, 1284-85 (9th Cir. 1970), aff'd, 405 U.S. 251 (1972).
42. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982).
43. 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1982). See Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc., 107 S. Ct.
484, 489 (1986); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 130
(1969); Schoenkopf v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 637 F.2d 205, 210 (3d Cir.
1980); Mid-West Paper Prods. Co. v. Continental Group, Inc., 596 F.2d 573, 591 (3d Cir.
1979).
44. See Mid-West Paper Prods. Co. v. Continental Group, Inc., 596 F.2d 573, 590-91
(3d Cir. 1979) (section 16 claim for injunctive relief "does not present the countervailing
considerations - such as the risk of duplicative or ruinous recoveries and the spectre of a
trial burdened with complex and conjectural economic analyses .... [A] person may
have standing to obtain injunctive relief even when he is denied standing to sue for treble
damages."). See also Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 261-62 (1972) (a defend-
ant potentially is liable for numerous individual and cumulative damages claims, but
"one injunction is as effective as 100, and, concomitantly... 100 injunctions are no more
effective than one").
45. See, e.g., Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 261-62 (1972); Mid-West
Paper Prods. Co. v. Continental Group, Inc., 596 F.2d 573, 590-91 (3d Cir. 1979).
46. See infra note 47.
47. See Grumman Corp. v. LTV Corp., 665 F.2d 10, 15-16 (2d Cir. 1981); Marathon
Oil Co. v. Mobil Corp., 530 F. Supp. 315, 320 (N.D. Ohio), aff'd, 669 F.2d 378 (6th Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 982 (1982). These cases did not explicitly discuss the Bruns-
wick antitrust injury requirement. They seem, however, only to address the first part of
the Brunswick test, that is, whether the injury was of the type the antitrust laws were
intended to redress. The cases fail to address the second part of the test which requires
"[injury] that flows from that which makes defendants' acts unlawful." Brunswick, 429
U.S. at 489. For example, in Babcock & Wilcox Co. v. United Technologies Corp., 435
F. Supp. 1249, 1255-56 (N.D. Ohio 1977), the court addressed the standing issue, without
discussing the holding in Brunswick. The defendant argued that plaintiff lacked standing
because it failed to prove injury arising out of a violation of the antitrust laws under
section 7 - the second requirement of the Brunswick test. The court, however, stated
that this argument "confuses standing with an element of an antitrust claim." Id. at 1255.
The court held that there is standing if the plaintiff alleges injury in fact, and it appears
the interests sought to be protected by plaintiff were arguably within the zone of interests
to be protected. See id.; supra note 23 and accompanying text. See also Carter Hawley
Hale Stores, Inc. v. Limited, Inc., 587 F. Supp. 246, 250 n.3 (C.D. Cal. 1984).
48. See Central Nat'l Bank v. Rainbolt, 720 F.2d 1183, 1186-87 (10th Cir. 1983);
Schoenkopf v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 637 F.2d 205, 210-11 (3d Cir. 1980);
Carter Hawley Hale Stores, Inc. v. Limited, Inc., 587 F. Supp. 246, 248-50 (C.D. Cal.
1984).
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Inc.49 settled the issue by definitively extending the antitrust injury re-
quirement to standing determinations for section 16 injunction actions.5"
In Cargill, a competitor sought to enjoin the proposed merger between
two of its larger rivals by alleging a section 7 violation.5 Applying the
rule of Brunswick, the Court held that a private plaintiff seeking injunc-
tive relief under section 16 must show a threat of antitrust injury: injury
of the type the antitrust laws were designed to prevent and injury that
flows from that which makes the defendants' acts unlawful.5 2 Although
acknowledging the differences between sections 4 and 16, the Court
found it anomalous to permit a plaintiff to seek an injunction for
threatened injury when it would not be entitled to damages had the in-
jury actually occurred.53 Therefore, a section 16 injunction may be
sought only for a threat of those injuries cognizable under section 4.1
The Court did note, however, that while both remedial provisions are
complementary and provide for private enforcement of the antitrust
laws,55 standing analysis for a section 16 injunction will not always be
identical to a section 4 standing determination.5 6 The Court established
antitrust injury as a threshold requirement for section 16,5' and noted
that, because standing analysis under section 16 raises no threat of multi-
ple lawsuits or duplicate recoveries, courts need consider only those
other standing factors identified in Associated General Contractors that
are relevant to a section 16 standing determination.58
The Court considered two possible theories of threatened antitrust in-
jury to the plaintiff competitor. The first theory is the threat of lost prof-
its resulting from the possibility that after the merger the more dominant
firm would manipulate prices at the expense of smaller competitors who
49. 107 S. Ct. 484 (1986).
50. See id. at 490-91.
51. See id at 487-88. The Justice Department, after reviewing the proposed acquisi-
tion under the premerger notification provisions of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act (15 U.S.C.
§ 18a (Supp. 1986)), had elected not to contest the merger.
52. See Cargill, 107 S. Ct. at 491 (quoting Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat,
Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977)).
53. See id at 489-91.
54. See id at 490.
55. See id at 490-91.
56. See idt at 490 n.6.
57. See id at 488-91. See Associated Gen. Contractors, Inc. v. California State Coun-
cil of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 535-46 (1983); see supra notes 25-31 and accompanying
text. Although the factors stressed by the Court in Associated General Contractors gave
the lower courts broad latitude to scrutinize the plaintiff's standing eligibility, it did not
state explicitly the weight to be given each factor. See Bhan v. NME Hosps., Inc., 772
F.2d 1467, 1470 n.3 (9th Cir. 1985) ("[T]he Supreme Court did not explicitly state that a
plaintiff must satisfy all of the Associated General Contractors factors or, indeed, any
particular factor. . . ."). The Court in Cargill resolved this ambiguity to some extent by
establishing the primacy of antitrust injury as a factor in an antitrust standing
determination.
58. Cargill, 107 S. CL at 490 n.6. See Associated Gen. Contractors v. California State
Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 535-46 (1983); see supra notes 25-31 and accompa-
nying text.
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would be caught in a profit squeeze.59 Relying on its holding in Bruns-
wick, the Court reiterated that the antitrust laws do not protect small
businesses from the loss of profits due to vigorous competition, but only
from profit losses arising from practices forbidden by the antitrust laws.60
The second theory is the threat that smaller competitors would be
driven out of business by the possibility that the post-merger firm would
engage in predatory pricing practices. 61 The Court found predatory pric-
ing harmful to "both competitors and competition" 62 since its purpose is
the elimination of competition. 63 Thus predatory pricing is" 'inimical to
the purposes of [the antitrust] laws,' and one capable of inflicting anti-
trust injury."' The Court emphasized, however, that the plaintiff had
neither alleged nor proved a threat of predatory pricing or that such a
practice in fact would occur after the merger.65 Because the plaintiff
failed to make a proper showing of a threat of antitrust injury, standing
to challenge the merger under section 16 was denied.66
In addition, the Court in Cargill expressly declined to embrace a gov-
ernment proposal denying competitors standing to challenge proposed
mergers in all cases.6 7 In refusing to effectively adopt a per se rule,68 the
59. Cargill, 107 S. Ct. at 491-93.
60. See id. at 492 ("[Competition for increased market share, is not activity forbid-
den by the antitrust laws ... for '[i]t is in the interest of competition to permit dominant
firms to engage in vigorous competition, including price competition.' ") (quoting Arthur
S. Langenderfer, Inc. v. S.E. Johnson Co., 729 F.2d 1050, 1057 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 1036 (1984)).
61. See id. at 493-94 ("Predatory pricing may be defined as pricing below an appro-
priate measure of cost for the purpose of eliminating competitors in the short run and
reducing competition in the long run.").
62. Id. at 493 (emphasis in original).
63. See id. at 493 (while "price cutting [is] aimed simply at increasing market share,
predatory pricing has as its aim the elimination of competition").
64. Id. at 493 (quoting Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477,
488 (1977)).
65. See id. at 493-94.
66. See id. at 495. Standing implicates the subject matter jurisdiction of the court.
Thus, failure to make a threshold showing of standing requires dismissal. See Carter
Hawley Hale Stores, Inc. v. Limited, Inc., 587 F. Supp. 246, 250 n.5 (C.D. Cal. 1984).
Because plaintiffs failed to make the required section 16 showing of antitrust injury, the
Court "need not reach the question of whether the proposed merger violates § 7." Car-
gill, 107 S. Ct. at 495. But see Tasty Baking Co. v. Ralston Purina, Inc., 52 Antitrust &
Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 284 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 21, 1987), where the court found the plaintiff
did have standing on a proper allegation of antitrust injury.
67. See Cargill, 107 S. Ct. at 495. The Court had been asked to address the broader
issue of whether competitors should ever be granted standing. See Brief for the United
States and the FTC as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitions at 10, Cargill, Inc. v. Montfort
of Colorado, Inc., 107 S. Ct. 484 (1986) (No. 85-473). There were four parts to the
government's argument:
(1) predatory pricing schemes are rarely tried or successful; (2) competitors'
motives in complaining about rivals' mergers are suspicious and create a pre-
sumption that a merger is procompetitive; (3) allowing competitor suits to block
mergers would lead to delay thereby frustrating efficiency generating mergers;
and (4) pre-merger competitor suits for actual predatory pricing injury are suffi-
cient means for enforcing § 7.
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Court stated that standing should not be denied to a party alleging
threatened injuries caused by anticompetitive behavior, merely because
such injuries rarely occur.69
In conclusion, by establishing antitrust injury as an element of a sec-
tion 16 standing determination, the Court clearly has circumscribed the
availability of an injunction for an alleged violation of the antitrust laws.
Further, the plaintiff's failure to allege a proper claim of antitrust injury
in the complaint highlights that the specificity with which the underlying
violation and resultant harm are stated is central to the determination of
the plaintiff's standing. Finally, the Court's refusal to adopt an absolute
bar to standing appears to reaffirm the need for a fact sensitive approach
to standing analysis in each case as mandated in Associated General
Contractors.70
II. TARGET STANDING
Section 7 of the Clayton Act was designed to prohibit the acquisition
by one corporation of all or part of the stock of another corporation if the
acquisition would substantially lessen competition.7" To establish a vio-
lation of the Act, the target company must prove that, given the ac-
quiror's actions, a reasonable probability exists that the takeover will
have anticompetitive effects in the relevant market.72 For purposes of
standing analysis, however, the courts generally assume that the plaintiff
can actually prove a substantive violation of the antitrust laws." Thus,
Stoll & Goldfein, "Where's The Beef?", N.Y.L.J., Jan. 21, 1987, at I, col. 1.
68. See Cargill, 107 S. Ct. at 495 ("ITihe United States invites the Court to adopt in
effect aper se rule 'denying competitors standing to challenge acquisitions on the basis of
predatory pricing theories.' We decline the invitation.") (citation omitted).
69. Id
70. 459 U.S. 519, 536 & n.33 (1983); see supra note 31 and accompanying text.
71. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1982).
72. The section 7 standard for illegality of an acquisition is whether the effect of the
acquisition "may be" to lessen competition substantially. Id. The courts have consist-
ently interpreted this phrase to mean that a reasonable probability, and not a mere possi-
bility of a reduction in competition, must be proven in order to establish a section 7
violation. See, eg., United States v. Marine Bancorporation, 418 U.S. 602, 622-23 (1974);
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 323 n.39 (1962) (quoting S. Rep. No.
1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 6); Standard Fashion Co. v. Magrane-Houston Co., 258 U.S.
346, 356-57 (1922).
73. See Tasty Baking Co. v. Ralston Purina, Inc., 52 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep.
(BNA) 284, 285 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 21, 1987) ("In all cases... plaintiffs must prove that they
face threatened antitrust injury, but evaluation of this proof is best separated from the
standing analysis, and deferred for consideration as part of the merits of the case and as a
factor determining the adequacy of plaintiffs' remedy at law."). Accord Monfort of Colo-
rado, Inc. v. Cargill, Inc., 761 F.2d 570, 574 n.2 (10th Cir. 1985), rev'd on other grounds,
107 S. Ct. 484 (1986). See Berger & Bernstein, supra note 17, at 859 ("mlhe assumption
that the plaintiff is within the substantive protection of the antitrust laws for purposes of
standing does not determine whether he is entitled to antitrust protection on the merits;
that question is decided only after appropriate development of the legal and factual bases
of the claim. .. ."); R. Taylor, Antitrust Standing: Its Growing--or More Accurately Its
Shrinking-Dimensions, 55 Antitrust L.J. 515, 518 (1986) (determination of standing not
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the requirement that the target corporation allege antitrust injury flowing
from the defendant's anticompetitive acts lies at the core of the standing
issue. The basic argument advanced for denying standing to a target cor-
poration to resist a takeover is two-fold. First, it is asserted that the
target corporation will always benefit from a takeover and, therefore, suf-
fers no harm.74 Second, it is asserted that target management is a suspect
plaintiff whose interests in bringing suit are not necessarily or even pre-
sumptively consistent with those of the company or its shareholders."
A. The Target Corporation and Antitrust Injury
A target corporation's standing to sue as an appropriate section 16
plaintiff must be predicated on a showing that the section 7 violation is
the proximate cause of its injury, and that the injury suffered is antitrust
injury.76 The target plaintiff must establish a precise causal nexus be-
tween the alleged antitrust violation and the alleged antitrust injury to
itself or standing will be denied. 77
Targets of hostile tender offers have routinely raised antitrust viola-
tions as defensive tactics, citing a litany of injuries that typically include
impairment of employee recruitment, morale, and performance; serious
dependent on whether "plaintiff can actually prove a substantive violation of the antitrust
laws").
74. See Carter Hawley Hale Stores Inc. v. Limited, Inc., 587 F. Supp. 246, 249 (C.D.
Cal. 1984); 2 P. Areeda & D. Turner, supra note 19, 346b, at 248; Easterbrook &
Fischel, Antitrust Suits by Targets of Tender Offers, 80 Mich. L. Rev. 1155, 1161 (1982)
[hereinafter Easterbrook & Fischel I].
75. 2 P. Areeda & D. Turner, supra note 19, % 346b, at 248; Easterbrook & Fischel I,
supra note 74, at 1166-68.
76. Reibert v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 471 F.2d 727 (10th Cir.), cert denied, 411 U.S.
938 (1973), discusses the standing prerequisite under both sections 4 and 16 of the Clay-
ton Act. In Reibert, the court identified the standing test as follows:
The aggrieved party must satisfy the 'by reason of' and/or 'by' requirements
found in Sections 4 and 16 of the Clayton Act, respectively. This prerequisite
boils down to complainant proving that the antitrust violations are the proxi-
mate cause of his injury. Two elements are necessary to demonstrate proximate
cause: (1) there is a causal connection between an antitrust violation and an
injury sufficient to establish the violation as a substantial factor in the occur-
rence of damage; and (2) that the illegal act is linked to a plaintiff engaged in
activities intended to be protected by the antitrust laws.
Id. at 731. See Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977);
see supra notes 32-40 and accompanying text. See also Schoenkopf v. Brown & William-
son Tobacco Corp., 637 F.2d 205, 210-11 (3d Cir. 1980) ("Standing under section 16 is
dependent on a showing of threatened loss or injury from the alleged antitrust violation.
Proximity between the plaintiff's injury and the antitrust violation, albeit necessary to a
lesser degree, is still required.") (citation omitted); City of Rohnert Park v. Harris, 601
F.2d 1040, 1044 (9th Cir. 1979) (standing under section 16 requires that plaintiff show
threatened harm cognizable in equity proximately resulting from alleged antitrust viola-
tion), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 961 (1980).
77. See Brunswick, 429 U.S. 477, 488-89 (1977); Reibert v. Atlantic Richfield Co.,
471 F.2d 727, 731 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 938 (1973). See also Carter Hawley
Hale Stores, Inc. v. Limited, Inc., 587 F. Supp. 246, 248 (C.D. Cal. 1984) (antitrust
standing requires injury "arising out of violation of those laws") (emphasis in original);
see supra notes 32-40.
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dislocations of management; loss of trade secrets; and disruption and un-
certainty in the business affairs of the corporation."8 These claims do
not constitute antitrust injury, however, because they do not result from
the possibility of substantially lessened competition. Rather, they are
concomitants of any corporate reorganization whether effected by a
change in corporate control or merger, legal or illegal. 9 The same
harms exist regardless of the anticompetitive effects of the acquisition,
and thus, by themselves, do not constitute antitrust injury to the target
company." To hold otherwise confuses injury to competitors with in-
jury to competition.8 ' Only when the threatened injuries arise out of ille-
gal conduct aimed at the elimination of competition can the target assert
antitrust injury. 2 For example, in an attempted horizontal takeover, 83 a
78. See Grumman Corp. v. LTV Corp., 665 F.2d 10, 15-16 (2d Cir. 1981) (disruption
of target's business and access to confidential information); Missouri Portland Cement
Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 498 F.2d 851, 869 (2d Cir.) (dislocation of employees, impairment of
long-range planning and hiring, and "unscrambling" of assets), cerL denied, 419 U.S. 883
(1974); Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. White Consol. Indus., 414 F.2d 506, 515-16 (3d Cir.
1969) (negative impact on employee recruitment and performance, access to trade
secrets, and impairment of target's "business operations with customers withholding or-
ders due to uncertainty of its future"), cert denied, 396 U.S. 1009 (1970); Carter Hawley
Hale Stores, Inc. v. Limited, Inc., 587 F. Supp. 246, 249 (C.D. Cal. 1984) (termination of
head-to-head competition, disruption and uncertainty in the business, and disclosure of
trade secrets); Marathon Oil Co. v. Mobil Corp., 530 F. Supp. 315, 320-21 (N.D. Ohio)
(impairment of future business, disclosure of confidential information, and employee ter-
mination), aff'd, 669 F.2d 378 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 982 (1982).
79. In Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977), the Court
rejected plaintiffs' argument that in order to pursue a section 7 claim, it need only demon-
strate injury "causally related" to an illegal presence in the market and stated:
Every merger of two existing entities into one, whether lawful or unlawful, has
the potential for producing economic readjustments that adversely affect some
persons. But Congress has not condemned mergers on that account; it has con-
demned them only when they may produce anticompetitive effects. Yet under
the Court of Appeals' holding, once a merger is found to violate § 7, all disloca-
tions caused by the merger are actionable, regardless of whether those disloca-
tions have anything to do with the reason the merger was condemned. This
holding would make . . . recovery entirely fortuitous, and would authorize
[sanctions] for losses which are of no concern to the antitrust laws.
Id. at 487.
80. See Central Nat'l Bank v. Rainbolt, 720 F.2d 1183, 1186-87 (10th Cir. 1983)
(harms asserted by stockholder-director and target corporation attributable to change of
control of the corporation and not the lessening of competition); A.D.M. Corp. v. Sigma
Instruments, Inc., 628 F.2d 753, 754 (1st Cir. 1980) ("If the sale of assets [at an inade-
quate price] had an effect on competition, it would have occurred whether or not [the
corporation] was harmed."); Reibert v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 471 F.2d 727, 731 (10th
Cir.) (termination of employment occurred as the "natural effect flowing from two simi-
larly structured businesses combining their assets to maximize efficiency" and not from
decreased competition), cerL denied, 411 U.S. 938 (1973); Carter Hawley Hale Stores,
Inc. v. Limited, Inc., 587 F. Supp. 246, 250 (C.D. Cal. 1984) (injuries alleged "would
occur in the event of a merger, whether or not the merger would substantially lessen
competition").
81. See Page, supra note 32, at 470.
82. See Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc., 107 S. Ct. 484, 492-93 (1986);
Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 488-89 (1977); Reibert v.
Atlantic Richfield Co., 471 F.2d 727, 731 (10th Cir.), cert denied, 411 U.S. 938 (1973);
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rival may seek to acquire effective control of a competitor for the purpose
of eliminating it in the relevant market.84 Where it can be shown that
customer uncertainty 85 concerning the target's viability in the market-
place is a factor that would lessen competition substantially, causing the
target to lose its market share and thus suffer a substantial decline in
revenues, antitrust injury of the type the antitrust laws were designed to
protect may be found.8 6 The loss of the target's competitive edge in the
marketplace reflects the anticompetitive effect of the violation and harms
both "competitors and competition. 87
Nonetheless, it has been stated that even if a merger has anticompeti-
tive effects, the target company does not have standing to raise the sec-
tion 7 violation because it becomes a part of the very entity that will
enjoy a superior economic advantage.88 Under the "deep pocket" or eco-
nomic benefit theory, the acquired target, by virtue of its affiliation with a
GAF Corp. v. Circle Floor Co., 463 F.2d 752, 757-59 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. dismissed, 413
U.S. 901 (1973). As the target area cases suggest, a defendant is not liable for all injuries
flowing from his violation, only for those anticompetitive in nature. See supra note 22;
see also Carlson Cos. v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 507 F.2d 959, 962 (8th Cir. 1974)
("[A]ny acquisition is likely to create some injury. But it is only anti-competitive injury
which § 7 was intended to eliminate ... .") (footnote omitted).
83. A horizontal merger has two basic consequences: the postmerger market has one
less firm; and the postmerger firm has a larger share of the market than the original
premerger firms. See H. Hovenkamp, supra note 1, § 11.1, at 293. Horizontal mergers
eliminate competition between the parties, and if unchecked, may facilitate monopolistic
or collusive pricing. See id. § 14.5, at 373.
84. See Tasty Baking Co. v. Ralston Purina, Inc., 52 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep.
(BNA) 284, 293 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 21, 1987) (competitor's specific illegal intent was to elimi-
nate competition through acquisition program and then increase price in a controlled
market).
85. Concern over the target company's ability to deliver the product either because it
might be in financial difficulty or cease to exist in the future, may deter customers from
continuing their business dealings with the company, presumably to the competitor's ad-
vantage. Loss of customer business may be relevant particularly where the target com-
pany derives its revenues from a product that must be made to specification. Customers
presumably would be reluctant to order in advance from a company that might not exist
when the time came to deliver on the contract. See Brief for Appellee at 40, H. H. Rob-
ertson Co. v. Guardian Indus. Corp., Nos. 85-3232 and 85-3233 (3d Cir. Jan. 9, 1986),
vacated for hearing en banc, Nos. 85-3232 and 85-3233 (3d Cir. Feb. 27, 1986).
86. See Cargill, 107 S. Ct. at 492 ("Brunswick holds that the antitrust laws do not
require the courts to protect ... businesses from the loss of profits due to continued
competition, but only against the loss of profits from practices forbidden by the antitrust
laws."). An operating division of the target company could be the competition that the
rival seeks to eliminate. Impairment of the asset base or lost revenues may substantially
impact the rival acquiror's investment both as to dividends and capital value. If by virtue
of its share holdings, the competitor can gain representation directly or indirectly on the
board of directors, it may wield sufficient power to force the abandonment or divestiture
of the division on the grounds that the division is on the borderline of profitability and
seems likely to result in an investment loss. See 5 P. Areeda & D. Turner, Antitrust Law
1203c, at 318-20 (1980). See infra notes 93-100 and accompanying text for discussion
of partial acquisitions.
87. Cargill, 107 S. Ct. at 493 (emphasis in original).
88. See Carter Hawley Hale Stores, Inc. v. Limited, Inc., 587 F. Supp. 246, 250 (C.D.
Cal. 1984).
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rich parent, presumably will be in a better position with the takeover
than without it, and therefore will suffer no harm.89 According to this
view, a target corporation does not have standing to bring an antitrust
action because it afortiori always benefits from the takeover" and, thus,
does not suffer antitrust injury. In fact, it suffers no injury at all. This
theory, however, paints with too broad a brush. It requires the courts to
effectively adopt aper se rule, expressly rejected by the Supreme Court in
Cargill.91 The economic benefit theory has relevance in the merger con-
text only when the circumstances of the case warrant it and only after a
careful analysis of the facts presented.92
Further, important distinctions must be made between full and partial
acquisitions.93 As a general rule, legal control of a corporation is ob-
tained by acquiring fifty percent or more of the corporation's outstanding
stock.94 In reality, however, the power to control a target corporation
effectively may exist with a far lesser percentage of ownership. 95
89. See 2 P. Areeda & D. Turner, supra note 19, 346b, at 248 (1978); Sidak, Anti-
trust Preliminary Injunctions in Hostile Tender Offers, 30 U. Kan. L. Rev. 492, 505
(1982).
90. 2 P. Areeda & D. Turner, supra note 19, 346b, at 248 ("Every theory for con-
demning a... merger implies a benefit for the acquired firm."); Easterbrook & Fischel I,
supra note 74, at 1161 ("The target is a beneficiary, not a victim, of any antitrust
injury.").
91. See Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc., 107 S. Ct. 484, 495 (1986). See
supra notes 67-69 and accompanying text.
92. See Associated Gen. Contractors, Inc. v. California State Council of Carpenters,
Inc., 459 U.S. 519, 536 n.33 (1983); Cromar Co. v. Nuclear Materials & Equip. Corp.,
543 F.2d 501, 506 (3d Cir. 1976); H. Hovenkamp, supra note 1, § 11.9, at 317 (1985).
93. See, eg., Gearhart Indus. v. Smith Int'l, Inc., 592 F. Supp. 203, 211 n.1 (N.D.
Tex.) (distinction made between target that ceases to exist after a takeover as the result of
a merger and 56% stock acquisition where target becomes subsidiary of the acquiror),
modified on other grounds, 741 F.2d 707 (5th Cir. 1984); 5 P. Areeda & D. Turner, supra
note 86, 1203, at 316-24.
94. See H. Hovenkamp, supra note 1, § 11.9, at 316.
95. The Supreme Court has assumed that an acquiror gains control when the percent-
age of shares held is "substantial." In United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co.,
353 U.S. 586 (1957), for example, the Court analyzed a section 7 violation of the Clayton
Act on the assumption that du Pont had substantial influence over General Motors' buy-
ing decisions even though only 23% of General Motors' shares was owned by du Pont.
Id at 588. See also United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 489 (1974)
(the acquiring firm owned 34% of the acquired company's shares but the parties agreed
there was "effective control"). The ability to exercise effective control of the target corpo-
ration may be achieved in several ways, such as representation on the board of directors,
participation in the policymaking process of the company, or by fostering technological
dependency. See, eg., F. & M. Schaefer Corp. v. C. Schmidt & Sons, 597 F.2d 814, 818(2d Cir. 1979) (per curiam) (29% interest likely to give acquiror the power to appoint
directors on target corporation's board of directors to gain "access to the confidential
trade information of one of its leading competitors"); Vanadium Corp. of America v.
Susquehanna Corp., 203 F. Supp. 686, 693-94 (D. Del. 1962) (19.7% interest sufficient to
oust target's board of directors); Briggs Mfg. Co. v. Crane Co., 185 F. Supp. 177, 181(E.D. Mich.) ("Every decision of a... director [controlled by the acquiror] will have an
immediate or remote effect upon the competitive relationship with [the target com-
pany]."), aff'd per curiam, 280 F.2d 747 (6th Cir. 1960); American Crystal Sugar Co. v.
Cuban-American Sugar Co., 152 F. Supp. 387, 393-94 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) (23% stock ac-
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Although there are no bright line tests to determine "legal control," own-
ership of fifteen to twenty percent of the target's voting stock can give the
acquiror significant influence over the operating and financial decisions
of the company.9 6 Under such circumstances, a partial acquisition at
best will have occurred rather than a complete takeover.97 The target
remains a competitor in the relevant market, albeit subject to the ac-
quiror's control, and its management and holdings are not incorporated
into the larger economic entity. Further, because the companies are not
merged, there will be no opportunity to realize procompetitive efficien-
cies. 98 Consequently, in the partial acquisition context, it is possible that
the target corporation may be seriously weakened as an effective compet-
itor and may suffer antitrust injury without realizing any economic bene-
fits flowing to it.
Whether a target corporation has suffered antitrust harm, therefore, is
a factual determination that can only be made after a careful assessment
of the "particular factual matrix" 99 of the case.100
quisition aimed at getting representation on target's board of directors that "would give
the nominee of [the acquiror] an opportunity to be thoroughly acquainted with the busi-
ness and plans of the [target] company and thereby to limit the effectiveness of the com-
petition between them"), aff'd, 259 F.2d 524 (2d Cir. 1958); Hamilton Watch Co. v.
Benrus Watch Co., 114 F. Supp. 307, 313-14 (D. Conn.) (if acquiror with 24% stock
interest is allowed representation on target's board of directors, it can obtain confidential
information which will "materially impair [the company's] competitive position"), aff'd,
206 F.2d 738 (2d Cir. 1953).
96. See Missouri Portland Cement Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 498 F.2d 851, 855 (2d Cir.)
(19% of total outstanding stock with intent to control), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 883 (1974);
Gulf & Western Indus. v. Great Ati. & Pac. Tea Co., 476 F.2d 687, 695 (2d Cir. 1973)
(19% stock interest sufficient basis for control); Vanadium Corp. of America v. Susque-
hanna Corp., 203 F. Supp. 686, 693-94 (D. Del. 1962) (working control can be obtained
with 19.7% of target company's stock); H. Hovenkamp, supra note 1, § 11.9, at 316-17.
97. Although a party's stock holdings may not permit complete control of the target
company, a partial acquisition, as the first step toward control, is properly analyzed as a
merger. For judicial scrutiny of antitrust violations and partial stock acquisitions ana-
lyzed as if a merger had occurred, see Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. White Consol. Indus.
Inc., 414 F.2d 506, 508-09 (3d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1009 (1970); United
Nuclear Corp. v. Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 539, 540 (E.D. Pa. 1969); Ameri-
can Crystal Sugar Co. v. Cuban-American Sugar Co., 152 F. Supp. 387, 395 (S.D.N.Y.
1957), aff'd, 259 F.2d 524 (2d Cir. 1958); 5 P. Areeda & D. Turner, supra note 86,
1203b, at 317. Even where control is neither acquired nor contemplated, however, sec-
tion 7 should confer jurisdiction to consider the anticompetitive effects of the partial ac-
quisition. See Denver & Rio Grande Western R.R. v. United States, 387 U.S. 485, 501
(1967) ("A company need not acquire control of another company in order to violate the
Clayton Act."); see also 5 P. Areeda & D. Turner, supra note 86, S 1203b, at 317.
98. See H. Hovenkamp, supra note 1, § 11.9, at 317.
99. Cromar Co. v. Nuclear Materials and Equip. Corp., 543 F.2d 501, 506 (3d Cir.
1976).
100. See Associated Gen. Contractors v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459
U.S. 519, 536 & n.33 (1983) (weigh the facts of each case); see also Cromar Co. v. Nuclear
Materials and Equip. Corp., 543 F.2d 501, 506 (3d Cir. 1976) (other factors to be consid-
ered in analyzing the facts include: the nature of the industry in which there exists an
alleged antitrust violation, the relationship between the plaintiff and the violator, and the
effect of the antitrust violation on the plaintiff).
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B. The Role of Target Management
A corollary issue in takeover contests focuses on whether the target's
management is the proper party to protect those interests the antitrust
laws were designed to serve. Commentators have suggested that since
management's incentives in bringing the action do not coincide so much
with protecting competition or their shareholders as with protecting their
own interests, the target company should be absolutely barred from con-
testing a tender offer. 1 ' The "fox guarding the henhouse"'12 argument
states that target managers use litigation as a defensive maneuver to se-
cure their own positions or to gain bargaining leverage in the bidding
process and that antitrust interests are rarely involved." 3 Therefore, it is
argued that granting antitrust standing to seek a section 16 injunction
gives a powerful weapon to target management whose private interests
make the company a suspect plaintiff.' °
Undoubtedly, self-interest does motivate some target managers to re-
sist a takeover.' 0 5 Further, invocation of the protection of the Clayton
Act as a routine tactic to raise the ante in takeover situations reflects a
clear misuse of the antitrust laws for purposes they were not meant to
101. See 2 P. Areeda & D. Turner, supra note 19, 346b, at 248; Easterbrook & Fis-
chel I, supra note 74, at 1166-68; Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of Target's
Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 1161, 1192-94 (1981)
[hereinafter Easterbrook & Fischel II].
102. Deputy Solicitor General Louis R. Cohen presented the government's view in oral
argument before the Supreme Court in Cargill and argued that customers and consumers
were the only persons who have standing to challenge a horizontal acquisition. He saw a
"fox guarding the henhouse problem" when a competitor sought to block a merger of two
of its rivals in a section 7 action explaining that a competitor would oppose mergers that
increase competition and favor those that do not increase competition. Justice Scalia
agreed with the statement in theory but did not believe the statute allowed such a distinc-
tion. See Competitor Standing in Merger Cases is Focus of Supreme Court Argument,
51 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 514 (Oct. 9, 1986). See also Brief for the United
States and the FTC as Anicus Curiae at 10, Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc.,
107 S. Ct. 484 (1986) (No. 85-473), supra note 67. The same argument applies, by anal-
ogy, in the target takeover context. The Supreme Court did not address the issue of
motive in Cargill.
103. See 2 P. Areeda & D. Turner, supra note 19, 346b at 248; Easterbrook & Fischel
I, supra note 74, at 1166-68; Easterbrook & Fischel II, supra note 101, at 1161-62; Sidak,
supra note 89, at 492-93.
104. See Missouri Portland Cement Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 498 F.2d 851, 854 (2d Cir.)
("Drawing Excalibur from a scabbard where it would doubtless have remained sheathed
in the face of a friendly offer, the target company typically hopes to obtain a temporary
injunction which may frustrate the acquisition .... "), cer. denied, 419 U.S. 883 (1974).
See also Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. White Consol. Indus., 414 F.2d 506, 510-11 n.8 (3d
Cir. 1969) (granting target company preliminary injunction may have "final" effect as
bidder will abandon its takeover plans rather than await outcome of lengthy and costly
litigation), cert denied, 396 U.S. 1009 (1970). It must be noted, however, that an ac-
quiror who has control of a target company may be able to terminate the litigation by
virtue of that control without a determination of the legal issues thereby entrenching its
position. See R. Schneiderman, Preliminary Relief in Clayton Act Section 7 Cases, 42
Antitrust L.J. 587, 589-90 (1973).
105. See Oesterle, Target Managers as Negotiating Agents for Target Shareholders in
Tender Offers: A Reply to the Passivity Thesis, 71 Cornell L. Rev. 53, 55 (1985).
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serve. By its holding in Cargill that the private plaintiff must plead and
prove a threat of antitrust injury,"0 6 however, the Supreme Court has
effectively limited the use of the antitrust preliminary injunction as a de-
fensive tactic to the target company. The question turns on antitrust in-
jury flowing to the target company from the purposefully anticompetitive
behavior and not on management's motives, which fade into irrelevance.
The proper focus, therefore, should be not on target management's moti-
vations for bringing the action, but upon the adequacy of its showing that
the proposed takeover will violate section 7 and on appropriate proof of
antitrust injury."17 Adopting an absolute bar denying a target corpora-
tion standing to contest a threatened takeover may arbitrarily preclude a
potential plaintiff who has the strongest incentive to prevent anticompeti-
tive behavior flowing from a section 7 violation. Standing determina-
tions, therefore, can only be made after careful scrutiny of the facts of
each case.
By limiting too narrowly the class of plaintiffs, the courts weaken the
enforcement remedy Congress created for ensuring vigorous competition
in the business sector. 108 The target corporation is entitled to fend off a
suitor consistent with shareholder interests and to invoke the protection
of the antitrust laws when competition is purposefully threatened. Anti-
trust injury is a rigorous test requiring a showing of harm not only to the
target competitor but to competition as well, 10 9 and thus implicates the
public interest in preserving strong competition.' Regardless of man-
106. See Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado, 107 S. Ct. 484, 495 (1986).
107. See Grumman Corp. v. LTV Corp., 665 F.2d 10, 11 (2d Cir. 1981); see also Ber-
ger & Bernstein, supra note 17, at 859. The optimal solution appears to be an order
allowing acquisition of the target's stock but preventing exercise of the voting rights, that
is, "sterilizing" the shares. Two objectives would be accomplished: (1) the target would
remain a viable competitor pending a resolution of the litigation; and (2) the acquiror
would be prevented from exercising immediate control. See Schneiderman, supra note
104, at 601-03.
108. See Cromar Co. v. Nuclear Materials and Equip. Corp., 543 F.2d 501, 506 (3d
Cir. 1976). See also Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, 395 U.S. 100, 130-31
(1969) (purpose of giving private parties treble damages and injunction remedy not
merely to provide for private relief but to serve "the high purpose of enforcing the anti-
trust laws"); Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 139
(1968) ("[T]he purposes of the antitrust laws are best served by insuring that the private
action will be an ever-present threat to deter anyone contemplating business behavior in
violation of the antitrust laws."). In discussing standing to sue under section 4, one com-
mentator notes that "[t]he concept of antitrust injury defines the kinds of harms that
should be compensable .... The function of antitrust standing should be complemen-
tary: to limit recovery to the... plaintiffs who are in the best position to impose the
deterrent penalty on the defendant."). Page, supra note 32, at 500. This statement is also
applicable to injunctive relief under section 16 as a complementary remedy.
109. See supra notes 49-66 and accompanying text.
110. See Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. White Consol. Indus., 414 F.2d 506, 517 (3d Cir.
1969) (court is duty bound to consider all issues properly raised where takeover has "far-
reaching economic consequences not only to the immediate parties but to the public as
well"), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1009 (1970). See also Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado,
Inc., 107 S. Ct. 484, 498-99 (1986) (Stevens & White, JJ., dissenting) (Congress made a
special provision in the Clayton Act for effective enforcement by private attorneys general
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agement's motivation, the target company serves as a "private attorney
general,"" 1 thereby protecting this public interest." 12 When a takeover
threatens the competitive process in a relevant market, the courts have a
clear duty to weigh carefully the claim for a preliminary injunction by
sifting through the facts, "even though the true concerns of the 'private
attorney general' may be more 'private' than 'attorney general.' " A
rule of standing for section 16 that requires proximity between the plain-
tiff's antitrust injury and the antitrust violation ensures that the plaintiff
"adequately represents the interests of the 'victims' of the antitrust
violation.""' 4
CONCLUSION
The antitrust laws were not enacted by Congress to be used as an auto-
matic strategy to resist a threatened takeover or as leverage in the negoti-
ating process for reasons wholly unrelated to antitrust interests. By
requiring that the private plaintiff plead and prove antitrust injury in
seeking an injunction under section 16 of the Clayton Act, the Supreme
Court in Cargill preserves the integrity of the antitrust laws in serving its
ultimate purpose, that of promoting competition in a dynamic economy
and facilitating consumer welfare. When a target company is threatened
by an unwanted takeover that may violate section 7, the fact that it is
characterized as a "takeover target" should not necessarily prescribe the
outcome of standing analysis. Rather, a determination of whether the
target litigant has been harmed must be made in light of the circum-
stances of each case. Associated General Contractors mandates this ap-
proach requiring the courts to strike a balance among the relevant
standing factors in addition to antitrust injury. The inquiry should be
fact-sensitive. Only by carefully analyzing the facts of a specific case can
a court determine whether the target corporation benefits from the take-
over or suffers an antitrust injury and should be granted standing to seek
an injunction under section 16 of the Clayton Act.
Matina Kesaris
and "[ilt would be a strange antitrust statute indeed which defined a violation enforceable
by no private party.").
111. Associated Gen. Contractors, Inc. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459
U.S. 519, 542 (1983).
112. Id The Court stressed the "existence of an identifiable class of persons whose
self-interest would normally motivate them to vindicate the public interest in antitrust
enforcement" as private attorneys general.
113. Grumman Corp. v. LTV Corp., 665 F.2d 10, 11 (2d Cir. 1981).
114. Schoenkopf v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 637 F.2d 205, 210 (3d Cir.
1980).
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